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TWENTY-SEVENTH ANNUAL
JEFFREY G. MILLER PACE
NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
MOOT COURT COMPETITION
PACE LAW SCHOOL
2015 Bench Memorandum

I. REGULATORY AND FACTUAL FRAMEWORK
A. PARTIES
Deep Quod Riverwatcher (Riverwatcher) is a not for profit
environmental organization under the laws of the State of New
Union. Riverwatcher is fully funded through membership dues
and charitable contributions. Its mission is to keep the Deep
Quod River and its tributaries protected from pollution and to
advocate for clean waterways. The Deep Quod River is itself
navigable and connects to the Mississippi River, which is used for
commercial navigation. Members use the Deep Quod River for
navigation, various recreational activities, and aesthetic
enjoyment. Dean James is one such member of the Riverwatcher
organization that uses the Deep Quod River for recreation and
navigation.
The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is
the federal agency responsible for enforcing and administering
select environmental laws and regulations. Their mission is to
protect human health and the environment from significant risk
17
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of harm. The State of New Union is subject to the administration
of environmental laws and regulations by EPA and through their
own state agencies. The State of New Union Department of
Agriculture (DOA) is one such state agency, and is also the
agency that has issued the classification for Moon Moo Farm.
Moon Moo Farm is a dairy farm in the State of New Union,
just outside the City of Farmville. The facility has 350 head of
milk cows, which are housed in a barn on the property. The cows
are not pastured at any time of the year. The DOA has designated
Moon Moo Farm as a no discharge animal feeding operation
(AFO). The classification means that there is not normally a
direct discharge from the facility into waters during a typical 25
year storm cycle. As a no discharge AFO, Moon Moo Farm must
submit a nutrient management plan (NMP) to the DOA that
describes application rates and expected nutrient uptakes levels.
B. APPLICABLE RULES OF LAW
 Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act) §
301, 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (2012)
 Clean Water Act § 502, 33 U.S.C. § 1362 (2012)
 Clean Water Act § 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2012)
 Clean Water Act § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2012)
 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act § 4005, 42 U.S.C.
6945 (2012)
 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act § 7002, 42 U.S.C.
§ 6972 (2012)
 Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations, 40 C.F.R. §
122.23 (2014)
 Definition of Solid Waste, 40 C.F.R. § 261.2 (2014)
 Classification of Solid Waste Disposal Facilities and
Practices – Scope and Purpose, 40 C.F.R. § 257.1 (2014)
 Criteria for Classification of Solid Waste Disposal
Facilities and Practices:
 Floodplains, 40 C.F.R. § 257.3-1 (2014)
 Ground Water, 40 C.F.R. § 257.3-4 (2014)
 Application to Land Used for the Production of Food Chain
Crops, 40 C.F.R. § 257.3-5 (2014)
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C. SUMMARY OF FACTS
The undisputed facts established by the district court are as
follows:
Moon Moo Farm is the operator of a dairy farm located ten
miles from the City of Farmville in the State of New Union. The
farm consists of 350 milk cows, which are housed in a barn and
not pastured. In 2010, Moon Moo Farm expanded to the current
350 cows from its previous 170 cows, due to the need to serve a
growing demand for milk by the Chokos Greek Yogurt facility. In
2012, Moon Moo Farm began accepting acid whey produced by
the Chokos facility. The manure and other liquid waste from the
cows is collected through an interconnected series of drains and
pipes that run from the barn to an outdoor lagoon. The acid whey
taken from the Chokos facility is added to the lagoon to create a
manure mixture, which is stored in the lagoon to be later used as
fertilizer. Per the design of the lagoon, the mixture should be fully
contained within it during any normal 25 year rainfall event.
Periodically, the manure mixture from the lagoon is pumped into
tank trailers, then hauled by tractor and spread on the Bermuda
grass fields that are also owned by Moon Moo Farm. Each
summer the Bermuda grass is dried and harvested as silage.
The Moon Moo Farm property, including its Bermuda grass
fields, is located at a bend in the course of the Deep Quod River.
Prior to Moon Moo Farm’s ownership of the property, a bypass
canal, now known as the Queechunk Canal, was excavated in
order to alleviate flooding that occurred at the river bend. The
Deep Quod River flows year round and runs into the Mississippi
River, which is a navigable in fact body of water that has long
been used for commercial navigation. However, most of the flow
of the Deep Quod River in the area near Moon Moo Farm is
diverted into the fifty yard wide and three to four feet deep
Queechunk Canal. The Deep Quod River, as well as the
Queechunk Canal, can be navigated by a canoe or small boat both
upstream and downstream. In addition, the community of
Farmville uses the Deep Quod River as a drinking water source
downstream of Moon Moo Farm. Moon Moo Farm owns the land
on both sides of the Queechunk Canal and has prominently
posted “No Trespassing” signs although the canal, which is
commonly used as a shortcut for the Deep Quod River.

3

20 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW ONLINE [Vol. 6
Moon Moo Farm is currently regulated by the State of New
Union as a “no discharge” animal feeding operation (AFO) and
therefore does not hold any permit issued pursuant to the
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES)
program. As a “no discharge” AFO, Moon Moo Farm does not
normally have a direct discharge into waters of the State of New
Union from its manure lagoon and handling facility during
conditions up to and including a 25 year storm event. As a “nodischarge” facility, Moon Moo Farm must submit a nutrient
management plan (NMP) to the Farmville Regional Office of the
State of New Union Department of Agriculture (DOA). Moon Moo
Farm’s NMP sets forth all planned seasonal manure application
rates and calculations of the expected uptake of nutrients by the
Bermuda grass fields. Moon Moo Farm has records stating that at
all times it has applied manure to its fields at rates consistent
with its NMP. The DOA has the authority to reject an NMP found
to be insufficient. However, they do not ordinarily review
submitted NMPs, and there is no provision providing for public
comment on submitted NMPs.
During the late winter and early spring of 2013, Deep Quod
Riverwatcher (Riverwatcher) received complaints of a manure
smell and turbid brown color coming from the Deep Quod River.
There was also a nitrate advisory issued for the drinking water
coming from the Deep Quod River, warning people that the water
was unsafe for drinking by infants due to high levels of nitrates.
Customers were advised to give bottled water to infants less than
two years old but that the nitrates did not pose any health threat
to adults or juveniles over the age of two. Nitrate advisories have
periodically been issued in Farmville in the past, before the
increase in Moon Moo Farm’s cows, specifically in 2002, 2006,
2007, 2009 and 2010. On April 12, 2013, in response to the
complaints, Dean James, a member of Riverwatcher, made an
investigatory patrol of the Deep Quod River on a small metal
outboard or “jon boat.” James ignored the posted “No
Trespassing” signs and proceeded up the Queechunk Canal. He
observed and photographed the manure spreading operations on
Moon Moo Farm’s fields as well as discolored brown water flowing
from the fields through a drainage ditch into the Queechunk
Canal. James took samples of the water flowing from the ditch
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and had them tested. The results showed highly elevated levels of
nitrates and fecal coliforms.
Riverwatcher submitted the affidavit of Dr. Ella Mae, an
agronomist whose stated opinion is that the lower pH of the
liquid manure, a result of adding the acid whey from the Chokos
facility, has lowered the pH of the soil in Moon Moo Farm’s fields.
Through testing of the soil obtained during discovery, Dr. Mae
determined that the pH level of the mixture was 6.1, a weak acid.
Dr. Mae states that this level of acidity prevented the Bermuda
grass from effectively taking in the nutrients from the manure
mixture. These unprocessed nutrients were released into the
environment, including the Deep Quod River, through leaching
groundwater and runoff during rain events. In addition, Dr. Mae
states that the application of the manure mixture during a rain
event is a poor management practice that will nearly always
result in runoff of nutrients from the fields. Moon Moo Farm
submitted an affidavit from Dr. Emmet Green, an agronomist
who stated that he did not dispute the assertion that the acid
whey reduced the pH level of the soil and nutrient uptake by the
Bermuda grass. However, Dr. Green stated that Bermuda grass
can tolerate a wide range of pH levels and that the application of
whey as a soil conditioner was a longstanding practice in the
State of New Union. Dr. Green also mentioned that there is
nothing in Moon Moo Farm’s NMP that prevents it from applying
the manure mixture during a rain event. Dr. Susan Generis,
Riverwatcher’s environmental health expert, conceded at her
deposition that although it was her opinion that Moon Moo
Farm’s discharges contributed to the April 2013 nitrate advisory,
it was impossible to state that the discharges were the “but for”
cause of the advisory.
Riverwatcher served Moon Moo Farm, the New Union
Department of Environmental Quality and EPA with a notice of
intent to sue under the citizen suit provisions of the Clean Water
Act (CWA) § 505, and the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act (RCRA) § 7002. Prior to the expiration of the waiting period,
EPA commenced a civil enforcement action against Moon Moo
Farm seeking civil penalties under CWA § 309(d) and injunctive
relief under CWA § 309(b). At the conclusion of the ninety-day
waiting period, Riverwatcher intervened in the EPA action
pursuant to CWA § 505(b)(1)(B) and alleged additional causes of
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action under the RCRA § 7002. Moon Moo Farm answered the
complaint and asserted a counterclaim against Riverwatcher
seeking damages and injunctive relief for trespass. Having
completed discovery, both sides moved for summary judgment.
On April 21, 2014, the district court denied Riverwatcher’s and
EPA’s motion for summary judgment on their CWA and RCRA
claims and granted Moon Moo Farm’s motion for summary
judgment dismissing the CWA and RCRA claims and granting
judgment on its counterclaim for trespass. EPA and Riverwatcher
appeal the district court’s decision finding that Moon Moo Farm is
not a concentrated animal feeding operation (CAFO) subject to
permitting under the NPDES program, that evidence was
obtained by trespass and is not admissible in a civil proceeding.
In addition, Riverwatcher appeals the district court’s holding that
Moon Moo Farm’s discharges fell within the agricultural
stormwater exemption of the CWA, the dismissal of the open
dumping and imminent and substantial endangerment claims
under RCRA, and the award of damages to Moon Moo Farm for
trespass.
II. ISSUES
The parties have been ordered to brief the following issues on
appeal:
 Whether the Queechunk Canal, a man-made body of
water, is a public trust navigable water of the State of
New Union, allowing for a private right of navigation
despite private ownership of the banks on both sides and
the bottom of the canal by Moon Moo Farm.
o On appeal, EPA and Riverwatcher will argue that
the Queechunk Canal is a publicly navigable
waterway.
o On appeal, Moon Moo Farm will argue that the
Queechunk Canal is not a publicly navigable
waterway.
 If the canal is not a public trust navigable water, whether
evidence obtained though trespass and without a
warrant is admissible in a civil enforcement proceeding
brought under CWA §§ 309(b), (d) and 505.
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o On appeal, EPA and Riverwatcher will argue that
evidence obtained through trespass is admissible.
o On appeal, Moon Moo Farm will argue that
evidence obtained through trespass is not
admissible
Whether Moon Moo Farm requires a permit under the
CWA NPDES permitting program because Moon Moo
Farm is a CAFO subject to NPDES permitting by virtue of
a discharge from its manure land application area.
o On appeal, EPA and Riverwatcher will argue
Moon Moo Farm is a CAFO that is subject to
NPDES permitting.
o On appeal, Moon Moo Farm will argue that it is
not a CAFO subject to NPDES permitting.
If Moon Moo Farm is not a CAFO, whether excess nutrient
discharges from its manure application fields remove it
from the agricultural stormwater exemption and
subject it to NPDES permitting liability.
o On appeal, Riverwatcher will argue Moon Moo
Farm is removed from the agricultural stormwater
exemption and is subject to NPDES.
o On appeal, EPA and Moon Moo Farm will argue
that application of manure in compliance with a
nutrient management plan (NMP) exempts it from
NPDES permitting under the agricultural
stormwater exemption.
Whether Moon Moo Farm is subject to a citizen suit under
RCRA because its land application of fertilizer and soil
amendment constitutes a solid waste subject to
regulation under RCRA Subtitle D.
o On appeal, Riverwatcher will argue that the
landspread mixture constitutes a solid waste and
Moon Moo Farm is subject to RCRA Subtitle D
regulation.
o On appeal, EPA and Moon Moo Farm will argue
that the landspread mixture does not constitute a
solid waste and is not subject to regulation under
RCRA Subtitle D.
If landspread manure and acid whey mixtures constitutes
a statutory “solid waste” subject to RCRA regulation,
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whether plaintiffs can establish an imminent and
substantial endangerment to human health subject to
redress under RCRA § 7002(a)(1)(B).
o On appeal, EPA and Riverwatcher will argue that
an imminent and substantial endangerment has
been established.
o On appeal, Moon Moo Farm will argue that an
imminent and substantial endangerment has not
been established.
III. PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE: IS THE QUEECHUNK
CANAL, A MAN-MADE WATER BODY, A PUBLIC
TRUST NAVIGABLE WATER OF THE STATE OF
NEW UNION, ALLOWING FOR A PRIVATE RIGHT
OF NAVIGATION DESPITE PRIVATE
OWNERSHIP OF THE BANKS ON BOTH SIDES
AND THE BOTTOM OF THE CANAL BY MOON
MOO FARM?
EPA and Riverwatcher contend that the Queechunk Canal
is a public trust navigable water of the State of New Union. If
the canal is a public trust navigable water, it allows for a public
right of navigation despite Moon Moo Farm’s private ownership of
the banks and bottom of the canal. Moon Moo Farm contends
that the Queechunk Canal is not a public trust navigable water of
the State of New Union that allows for a public right of
navigation because the banks and bottom are privately owned.
The public trust doctrine was explicated in Ill. Cent. R.R. Co.
v Illinois, finding that a state may hold title to the beds of
navigable waters “in trust for the people of the state that they
may enjoy the navigation of the water . . .” 146 U.S. 387, 452
(1892); see also Newcomb v. Cnty. of Carteret, 701 S.E.2d 325,
336-37 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010).1 Under the public trust doctrine a
state may subject a riparian owner to rules and regulations for
the protections of public right to the water. State of Alaska, Dep’t.
of Natural Res. v. Alaska Riverways, Inc., 232 P.3d 1203, 1211
(Alaska 2010). The Montana Supreme Court found that the public
1. In addition, it has been found that public waterways are held by the state
for the use and enjoyment by the public. St. Croix Waterway Ass’n v. Meyer, 178
F.3d 515, 518-19 (8th Cir. 1999).
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owns an “in stream, non-divisionary right” to the use of a state’s
navigable surface waters for recreational purposes. Mont. Trout
Unlimited v. Beaverhead Water Co., 255 P.3d 179, 184-85 (Mont.
2011).
However, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that privately
owned man-made waterways did not become open to all citizens
just because they connected to other navigable waterways.
Kaiser-Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179 (1979). This case
looked at navigable water in the context of interstate commerce,
not taking into account the public trust doctrine of states. As
cases of navigability cannot all be lumped together one must look
at the purpose for which navigability was invoked in a particular
case in order to determine whether to apply the public trust
doctrine. Id.; see also Vaughn v. Vermillion, 444 U.S. 206, 208
(1979). Historically, determination of navigability in terms of
state waterbed title was based on federal law for interstate
navigable waters, but state public trust doctrines must also be
taken in account.
In this case, the resolution of whether Queechunk Canal is a
navigable water subject to the public trust doctrine will turn on
whether a man-made canal on privately owned land could be
considered to be included within the public trust doctrine
allowing for public right of passage under state law. One test
used to determine whether a waterway is navigable in fact under
federal law asks if the waterway is currently used or is
susceptible to being used in its ordinary or natural condition as a
highway for commerce. PPL Mont., LLC v. Montana, 132 S. Ct.
1215, 1228 (2012). EPA and Riverwatcher have a persuasive
argument that the canal is a public trust navigable water based
on a North Carolina Court of Appeals case, Fish House, Inc. v.
Clarke, a trespass action revolving around the use of a canal on
private property. 693 S.E.2d 208 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010). Moon
Moo Farm will rely on Supreme Court cases including Kaiser
Aetna and Vaughn in its counter arguments. However, it will also
need to cite state case law in order to avoid the application of
public trust doctrine.
EPA and Riverwatcher will argue that Queechunk Canal is
a publicly navigable man-made waterway that is subject to
private rights of navigation. These parties will draw parallels
between this case and Fish House, Inc., a trespass action brought
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by one property owner against an adjoining property owner to
prohibit the use of a canal that divided the two properties. Id. at
210. In that case, the North Carolina court held that a canal,
although man-made, was a navigable waterway subject to the
public trust doctrine. 693 S.E.2d at 211. They will also rely on
The Daniel Ball for the proposition that all waterways that are
navigable in fact are navigable in law. 77 U.S. 557, 563 (1870); see
also Gwathmey v. State of North Carolina, 464 S.E.2d. 674, 68182 (N.C. 1995) (quoting State of North Carolina v. Baum, 38 S.E.
900, 901 (N.C. 1901)). Other state court cases will also help EPA
and Riverwatcher’s argument. For example, one Supreme Court
of North Carolina case stated that if a body of water can be
navigated in its natural condition it is navigable in fact even if it
had not actually been navigated previously. Gwathmey, 464
S.E.2d at 681-82. South Carolina’s Hughes case also bolsters their
argument, holding that when a canal is constructed in order to
connect with navigable waters – as the Queechunk was – it will
be deemed part of the waters. Hughes v. Nelson, 399 S.E.2d 24, 25
(S.C. Ct. App. 1990).
EPA and Riverwatcher will also seek to reframe the legal
inquiry used to determine navigability, arguing that whether a
waterway is artificial is not controlling. Id. The question is not
whether the waterway itself is natural or artificial but rather
whether the water flows without dwindling or obstruction. State
of North Carolina v. Twiford, 48 S.E. 586, 587 (N.C. 1904). The
true test to be applied is whether a waterway is “inherently and
by its nature” capable of being used for navigation, whether or
not that is its actual use or the extent of the use. Id.; see also
State ex. rel Medlock v. S.C. Coastal Council, 346 S.E.2d. 716, 719
(S.C. 1986).
Moon Moo Farm will counter that Queechunk Canal is not
a publicly navigable man-made waterway subject to private
rights of navigation due to the fact that the farm privately owns
the banks and bottom of the canal. It may cite a Louisiana Court
of Appeals case stating that navigability of a waterway is not
presumed and that the burden of proof lies with the party
asserting the navigability (here, EPA and Riverwatcher). Shell
Oil Co. v. Pitman, 476 So.2d. 1031, 1035 (La. Ct. App. 1985).
Although Kaiser Aetna and Vaughn will be helpful to Moon Moo
Farm’s argument, it must also rely on state cases. For example,

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol6/iss1/2

10

2015]

NELMCC BENCH MEMO

27

the Court of Appeals for Louisiana held that a privately owned
waterway, although navigable in fact, might not be subject to
public use. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. White, 302 So.2d. 660, 668 (La.
Ct. App. 1974). As the canal was constructed with private funds
and on private property, the court was not willing to allow the
canal title to be “vested in a whole nation” solely because it was
originally constructed to be deep enough to be navigable and
allow for flowing water. Id. at 665. The court likened the canal to
a private road: although used by commercial traffic it may not be
subject to public use. Id. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, similar in facts to
this case, is a trespass action brought by private landowners
against persons using a canal on their property. Additionally, the
Fifth Circuit has held that waterways made navigable through
private dredging were not subject to navigational servitude.
Dardar v. Lafourche Realty Co., Inc., 55 F.3d 1082, 1085-86 (5th
Cir. 1995). Even if a waterway was navigable, a navigational
servitude could not be imposed. Id. In addition, a Louisiana
appellate case held that private canals were not navigable waters
subject to public use. Buckskin Hunting Club v. Bayard, 868
So.2d 266, 271-72 (La. Ct. App. 2004). Although their facts are
not directly on point with the case here, these cases will be
important to Moon Moo Farm because the Queechunk Canal was
created on private land. If it is not subject to a navigational
servitude, then there is no public right of access and
Riverwatcher agent James was trespassing.
Moon Moo Farm may also argue that the public trust
status of a particular water must be determined at the time of a
State’s admission into the United States under the “Equal
Footing Doctrine,” citing United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 6
(1935). Since the Queechunk Canal had not been constructed at
the time of New Union’s entry into the Union, imposition of a
navigational servitude would constitute a taking2 of private
property requiring compensation under the Fifth Amendment.
2. There is another possible taking claim that Moon Moo Farm could make
but should not be a main argument. A Florida Supreme Court case held that
there was no unconstitutional deprivation of an owner’s littoral right without
just compensation as land seaward of the high water line is subject to the public
trust doctrine. Walton Cnty. v. Stop Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So.2d 1102
(Fla. 2008). The Walton case looked at waters that are subject to public trust
doctrine, which cannot be unconstitutionally taken even if no compensation is
given.
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See Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. 164. EPA and Riverwatcher may
counter that Oregon applies only to the question of title to lands
as between the State and the United States, that the question of
a public trust navigational servitude is a question of State law,
and that no taking would occur based on consistent application of
state law public trust principles. Cf. Stop the Beach
Renourishment v. Florida, 560 U.S. 702 (2010).
IV. EXCLUSIONARY RULE: IF THE CANAL IS NOT A
PUBLIC TRUST NAVIGABLE WATER, IS
EVIDENCE OBTAINED THROUGH TRESPASS
AND WITHOUT A WARRANT ADMISSIBLE IN A
CIVIL ENFORCEMENT PROCEEDING BROUGHT
UNDER CWA §§ 309(B), (D) AND 505?
The exclusionary rule is ordinarily applied in criminal law to
prevent the introduction of evidence that was illegally obtained in
violation of the Fourth Amendment Search and Seizure right.
Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 347 (1987). Moon Moo Farm
contends that since the Queechunk Canal is not a public trust
navigable water of the State of New Union, evidence obtained
through trespass and without a warrant is not admissible in a
civil proceeding and is subject to the exclusionary rule. EPA and
Riverwatcher contend that, even if the Queechunk Canal is not
a public trust navigable water of the State of New Union and
therefore James was committing a trespass, evidence obtained
without a warrant is admissible in a civil enforcement proceeding
and not subject to the exclusionary rule.
In this case, the district court followed the cases of Trinity
Indus., Inc. v. OSHRC and Smith Steel Casting Co. v. Brock,
which stated that even in civil enforcement cases the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule applies. 16 F.3d 1455, 1461-62 (6th
Cir. 1994); 800 F.2d 1329, 1334 (5th Cir. 1986). Therefore, it held
that the evidence obtained by James on April 12, 2013 is not
admissible. It further stated that EPA should not be allowed to
violate Fourth Amendment rights just because a third party
organization obtains the evidence it decides to use.
EPA and Riverwatcher will point out that, in civil
litigation, whether illegally obtained evidence is admissible is
usually left up to the district court as there is not a standard
exclusionary rule in civil cases. Borges v. Our Lady of the Sea
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Corp., 935 F.2d 436, 440 (1st Cir. 1991); Park v. El Paso Bd. of
Realtors, 764 F.2d 1053, 1066 (5th Cir 1985); Trans-Cold Exp.,
Inc. v. Arrow Motor Transit, Inc., 440 F.2d 1216, 1218 (7th Cir.
1971).3 The Supreme Court has never applied the exclusionary
rule to civil proceedings even though it has applied the rule in
criminal proceedings. Id. at 447 (1976) (holding IRS was not
prohibited from using evidence obtained by the LAPD); see also
I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1033 (1984) (holding that
exclusionary rule should not apply in deportation case). These
parties will rely on the balancing test developed by the Supreme
Court in United States v. Janis and cite instances where the
exclusionary rule has not been applied in civil cases. 428 U.S. 433
(1976). For criminal cases, Janis established a balancing test that
examines whether the deterrent benefit from applying the
exclusionary rule would outweigh the detriment to the public
interest. 428 U.S. at 447. For civil cases, Janis established a
balancing test that weighs the deterrent effect of applying the
exclusionary rule against the societal costs of excluding the
evidence in question but also takes into account the integrity of
the judicial process. Id.; see also Marjorie A. Shields,
Admissibility, in Civil Proceedings, of Evidence Obtained Through
Unlawful Search and Seizure, 105 A.L.R. 5th 1 (2003). Using
Janis’s civil balancing test, EPA and Riverwatcher can show that
the public interest benefit of uncovering Moon Moo Farm’s
discharging into the Queechunk Canal outweighs the effect that
excluding the evidence has on deterring other trespassers. They
may also point out that the Ninth Circuit stated that the
inadmissibility of evidence obtained illegally is not applicable
where it is not a matter of criminal procedure or sanctions
imposed. N.L.R.B. v. South Bay Daily Breeze, 415 F.2d 360, 364
(9th Cir. 1969).
Finally, even if this court finds that the exclusionary rule
should apply, EPA and Riverwatcher may rely on a good faith
exception to the rule by arguing that James acted in good faith as
he thought the Queechunk Canal was a publicly navigable water
body. Using the same cases cited here by the district court, Smith
Steel Castings Co. determined that the exclusionary rule applies

3. The case of Trans-Cold Exp., Inc. v. Arrow Motor Transit, Inc. cites to
F.R.C.P. 43(a) as a “rule of admissibility, not exclusion.”
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when penalties are assessed unless the good faith exception can
be applied. 800 F.2d at 1330 (citing United States v. Leon, 468
U.S. 897, 905 (1984) (evidence obtained by police who acted in
good faith reliance on a warrant later found to lack probable
cause was admissible)). These parties can liken James’ actions to
those of the police officer who believed he possessed a valid
warrant.
Moon Moo Farm will counter that since the Queechunk
Canal is not a public trust navigable water, James was
trespassing and any evidence obtained by him during that
trespass should not be admissible in this case. It will rely on the
cases cited by the district court and liken this case to a criminal
case where the exclusionary rule applies. Courts have applied the
exclusionary rule to civil cases that are “quasi-criminal” or
similar to criminal cases in nature. Christine L. Andreoli,
Admissibility of Illegally Seized Evidence in Subsequent Civil
Proceedings: Focusing on Motive to Determine Deterrence, 51
Fordham L. Rev. 1019, 1021 (1983). For example, forfeiture
proceedings have been deemed quasi-criminal in nature and
therefore the exclusionary rule applies. One 1958 Plymouth
Sedan, 380 U.S. 693, 702 (1965) (evidence obtained during a car
search without a warrant could not be used in proceeding for
forfeiture of the car); see also One 1976 Cadillac Seville, 477 F.
Supp. 879, 883 (E.D. Mich. 1979).
Additionally, Moon Moo Farm can point to one of the
primary purposes of the exclusionary rule – the deterrence of
future 4th Amendment violations – to bolster its argument for
application of the exclusionary rule. It might use the balancing
test from Janis to argue that the deterrent benefit of excluding
the evidence outweighs the detriment to the public interest. 428
U.S. at 447. Moon Moo Farm could also point to James’ motive as
a trespasser and argue for weighing the motive of the person
collecting the evidence against the deterrent effects of the
exclusionary rule instead of weighing the benefits to society
against the deterrent effects. See Tirado v. Comm’r, 689 F.2d 307,
310 (2d Cir. 1982) (finding that the likelihood of deterrence
requires an assessment of motive and an inquiry into a person’s
motivation is fundamental in order to translate the idea of
deterrence into a decision). It might also make an argument for
excluding the evidence to deter future illegal conduct based on
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the heightened deterrence effect in an intrasovereign case (which
we have here) versus an intersovereign case (which Janis was).4
However, this is not Moon Moo Farm’s strongest argument on
this issue as it requires them to liken James to an agent of EPA
and may best be avoided.
V. CLEAN WATER ACT VIOLATIONS: DOES MOON
MOO FARM NEED A PERMIT UNDER THE CWA
NPDES PERMITTING PROGRAM?
A. Is Moon Moo Farm a CAFO subject to NPDES
permitting by virtue of a discharge from its manure land
application area?
The National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
(NPDES) program under the Clean Water Act (CWA) seeks to
regulate discharges of a pollutant from a point source into
navigable waters of the United States. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2012).
EPA and Riverwatcher contend that Moon Moo Farm is a
concentrated animal feeding operation (CAFO) subject to NPDES
permitting because of discharge from its manure land application
area. Moon Moo Farm contends that the State of New Union
has deemed it a “no-discharge” animal feeding operation (AFO),
and that it is not a CAFO subject to NPDES permitting based on
discharges from its land application area.

4. Because the exclusionary rule applies in cases where a sovereign entity
uses evidence obtained by a third party and the sovereign participated in
obtaining the evidence, Moon Moo Farm might also argue (albeit weakly) that
James acted in conjunction with and is similar to an agent of EPA and the
government. In response, EPA and Riverwatcher would argue that James is not
an agent of either organization. Pike v. Gallagher, 829 F. Supp. 1254, 1264
(D.N.M. 1993). After likening James to an “agent,” Moon Moo Farm could then
argue that, because this is an intrasovereign litigation (all occurring within New
Union), the deterrent effect of excluding the evidence would be more significant
than it might be in an intersovereign case. See Vander Linden v. United States,
502 F. Supp. 693, 697 (S.D. Iowa 1980) (holding that the government could not
use evidence obtained illegally). Applying the exclusionary rule in
intrasovereign cases would accomplish that purpose because the sovereign
government can restrain its agents from future 4th Amendment violations.
Conversely, application in intersovereign cases would not have a deterrent effect
because one sovereign has no power to restrain another’s agents from future 4th
Amendment violations. See Id.
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Generally, an animal agricultural facility needs to first meet
a definition of an AFO as stated by EPA before it can be classified
as a CAFO subject to NPDES permitting. All parties agree that
Moon Moo Farm is considered an AFO as the State of New Union
designates it as a “no-discharge” AFO. Concentrated Animal
Feeding Operations, 40 C.F.R. § 122.23(b)(1) (2014). If a facility
meets the definition of an AFO, one must then determine
whether it meets the definitions of a CAFO and can be regulated
under the NPDES program. A CAFO can be regulated under the
NPDES program because CAFOs are point sources as defined by
the CWA. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14). The parties dispute whether
Moon Moo Farm is a Medium CAFO subject to NPDES
permitting. To be a Medium CAFO for a dairy cattle operation,
the facility must have 200 – 699 cattle, which is not at issue in
this case as Moon Moo Farm has 350 cattle. § 122.23(b)(6)(i)(A).
However, the facility must also have a man-made ditch or pipe
that carries manure or wastewater to area surface waters – a key
determination for this issue in this case. § 122.23(b)(6)(ii).
EPA and Riverwatcher will argue that Moon Moo Farm is
a Medium CAFO and should be subject to NPDES permitting as a
result of discharges from its manure land application area into
the Queechunk Canal through a man-made drainage ditch on the
property. An important case for EPA and Riverwatcher is Nat’l
Pork Producers Council v. E.P.A., which held that EPA had
authority to impose a duty to apply for a NPDES permit on
CAFOs that were discharging. 635 F.3d 738, 751 (5th Cir. 2011).
The primary purpose of the CWA is to control pollution through
regulation of discharges into navigable waters. If a CAFO is
discharging it must therefore have a permit. Id. It would be
counter to congressional intent to find that requiring a
discharging CAFO to have a permit is unreasonable under the
CWA. Id. EPA and Riverwatcher may also rely on language in the
regulations stating that the appropriate authority5 may designate
any AFO as a CAFO if it determines that it is a significant
contributor of pollutants. 40 C.F.R. § 122.23(c). There are a
number of factors that can be considered in determining whether
to designate an AFO as a CAFO for the purpose of requiring a

5. Specifically referring to the State Director or Regional Administrator of
an EPA approved NPDES program.
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NPDES permit: the size of the operation and amount of waste
reaching water; the location of the operation relative to water; the
means of conveyance of animal waste and waste water; other
factors affecting the likelihood and frequency of discharges into
water; or any other relevant factor. § 122.23(c)(2)(i)-(v). This
authority is bolstered by a Washington case where the district
court was unwilling to use the narrow definition of CAFO just
because confined animals and fields were not adjacent. Cmty.
Ass’n for Restoration of Env’t v. Sid Koopman Dairy, 54 F. Supp.
2d 976 (E.D. Wash. 1999). It ultimately deemed a dairy farm a
CAFO because it generated significant waste. Id. EPA and
Riverwatcher can make many factual arguments for regulating
Moon Mood Farm as a Medium CAFO based on the factors listed
in 122.23(c)(2)(i)-(v) (e.g., its location at the bend of the river, its
landspreading operations before rainfall, the pattern of nitrate
advisories over the past decade, etc.)
Moon Moo Farm will argue that it does not meet the
definition of a CAFO as it is not discharging into navigable water
from its manure land application area through a man-made ditch.
An important case for Moon Moo Farm will be Waterkeeper
Alliance, Inc. v. E.P.A., which found that EPA exceeded its
statutory authority by requiring that CAFOs either apply for a
NPDES permit or affirmatively demonstrate that there is no
potential for a discharge now or in the future. 399 F.3d 486, 505
(2d Cir. 2005). In order for a facility to be deemed a CAFO, a
discharge must be demonstrated; the discharge cannot be
assumed. Id. The CWA gives EPA the authority to regulate only
actual discharges from a point source, not just a potential
discharge or a point source generally. Id. Therefore, without an
actual a discharge of a pollutant from the point source there is no
violation. NRDC v. E.P.A., 859 F.2d 156, 179 (D.C. Cir. 1988); see
also Service Oil, Inc. v. EPA, 590 F.3d 545, 550 (8th Cir. 2009).
The 2003 CAFO Rule violated this statutory scheme by imposing
permitting requirements on all CAFOs regardless of whether
they have discharged. The Waterkeeper decision required EPA to
revise the CAFO rule, prompting the release of the 2006 and 2008
rules. See also 40 C.F.R. § 122.23 (d)-(f).
Moon Moo Farm may also argue that even if there is a
drainage ditch that flows from the fields where the manure is
landspread into the Queechunk Canal, it is still not enough for
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classification as a Medium CAFO. There is no man-made ditch or
flushing system on the property that carries the manure mixture
from the production or processing area to the navigable water.
The runoff that is draining from the fields and through the
drainage ditch into the Queechunk Canal is precipitation based
and not purposely discharged into the water. Alt. v. EPA, 979 F.
Supp. 2d 701, 711 (N.D. W.Va. 2013). Furthermore, production
and processing areas as well as the animal confinement area are
separated from the Bermuda grass fields where any direct runoff
from the AFO would occur. Id. at 714. Moon Moo Farm may also
cite Nat’l Pork Producers Council for its holding that EPA lacked
authority to issue regulation stating that CAFOs should be liable
for failing to apply for a NPDES permit. 635 F.3d at 752 (CWA
clearly states when EPA can issue compliance orders through §
309 and does not mention failing to apply for a permit). Finally, it
may bolster its argument by pointing to a Kentucky case holding
that CAFOs were not required to have state PDES permits when
landspreading manure as Moon Moo does here. Commonwealth of
Kentucky, Energy and Env’t v. Sharp, Nos. 2009-CA-002283-MR,
2009-CA-002326-MR, 2012 WL 1889307 (May 25, 2012) (hog
famers not required to obtain KPDES permits even though land
applying manure).
B. If Moon Moo Farm is not a CAFO, do excess nutrient
discharges from its manure application fields remove it
from the agricultural stormwater exemption and subject it
to NPDES permitting liability?
Riverwatcher contends that Moon Moo Farm is a CAFO
and therefore subject to NPDES permitting. Riverwatcher further
contends that, even if Moon Moo Farm does not meet the
definition of a Medium CAFO, the runoff from the landspreading
fields constitutes a point source discharge subject to NPDES
permitting. There is an agricultural stormwater exemption to the
NPDES requirement that allows for a precipitation related
discharge. EPA and Moon Moo Farm contend that, because
Moon Moo Farm is not a CAFO, the farm’s land application of
manure in accordance with a nutrient management plan (NMP)
is exempt from NPDES permitting under the agricultural
stormwater exemption.
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EPA’s land application rule states that, generally, discharges
of manure into waters of the United States from a CAFO due to
the application of manure to facility owned areas of land is a
discharge subject to NPDES permitting. 40 C.F.R. § 122.23(e).
The exception to this is the agricultural stormwater discharge
exemption, which allows manure application in accordance with
an NMP and precipitation related discharges to occur without the
facility becoming subject to NPDES permitting. Id. An
agricultural stormwater discharge or return flow from an
irrigated agriculture exemption to a point source is specifically
carved out of the definition under the CWA. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14).
When manure is spread in accordance with a site specific NMP
that “ensure[s] appropriate agricultural utilization of the
nutrients in the manure,” any precipitation related discharge
from the land area is considered an exempt agricultural
stormwater discharge. § 122.23(e)(1). The NMP must identify site
specific appropriate buffers or equivalent practices to control
runoff of pollutants and establish land application protocols for
manure that ensure appropriate agricultural utilization of the
nutrients. § 122.42(e)(1)(vi)-(ix).
The district court followed the ruling in Alt v. EPA, which
held that runoff of litter and manure from a field outside the
animal production area did not constitute a CAFO discharge and
was instead agricultural stormwater discharge exempt from
NPDES permitting requirements. 979 F. Supp. 2d at 711.
Riverwatcher argues that, even if Moon Moo Farm is not a
CAFO, its excess application of wastes to its fields using manure
spreaders, which are discrete and confined conveyances,
constitutes a point source discharge requiring a NPDES permit. A
case that will be particularly important for this argument is
Concerned Area Residents for Env’t v. Southview Farm, which
found that manure spreading vehicles were point sources. 34 F.3d
114, 119 (2d Cir. 1994). The Second Circuit therefore held that
the dairy operation could not avail itself of the agricultural
stormwater exemption even though crops were grown in an area
outside where animals were kept. Id.; see also Cmty. Ass’n for
Restoration of Env’t v. Sid Koopman Dairy, 54 F. Supp. 2d at 981
(instruments used to apply animal waste will be considered point
sources themselves). Additional cases have found that manure
spreading vehicles and fields or ditches used to store or transfer
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waste are included in defining a CAFO as a point source in order
to serve the purposes of the CWA. See United States v. Weisman,
489 F. Supp. 1331, 1337 (M.D. Fla. 1980); Avoyelles Sportsmen’s
League, Inc. v. Alexander, 473 F. Supp. 525, 532 (W.D. La. 1979).6
Relying on Sid Koopman Dairy, Riverwatcher will also
argue that Moon Moo Farm’s land application is not in best
practices and its NMP cannot shield it from permitting liability
through the agricultural stormwater exemption. 54 F. Supp. 2d at
981 (stating that a CAFO cannot avoid responsibility for over
application or misapplication of waste to fields through the
agricultural stormwater exemption). It will also show that the
Ninth Circuit has found that a facility that over applies – and
therefore misapplies – manure wastewater to its field is subject to
NPDES permitting. Cmty. Ass’n for Restoration of the Env’t v.
Henry Bosma Dairy, 305 F.3d 943, 954 (9th Cir. 2002) (relying on
testimony of residents who had seen manure wastewater applied
to the fields located on the property and then spillage occurring
into a nearby canal).
Finally, Riverwatcher will also argue that Moon Moo Farm
cannot claim the agricultural stormwater discharge exemption
because its use of the mixture of manure and acid whey was
really waste disposal rather than application of fertilizer. See
infra Riverwatcher argument at 19-20. It will point out that Moon
Moo Farm’s NMP was procedurally defective since there was no
review of the NMP by the public or the New Union Department of
Agriculture (DOA). Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc., 399 F.3d at 498.
The final 2008 EPA CAFO rule requires that when an NMP is
submitted for the purpose of NPDES permitting requirements,
permitting authorities must conduct a review of the NMP and
provide for public review and comment. Revised National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permit Regulation and
Effluent Limitations Guidelines for Concentrated Animal Feeding
Operations in Response to the Waterkeeper Decision, 73 Fed.
Reg. 70,418 (November 20, 2008). Making the determination that
Moon Moo Farm is a “no discharge” AFO not subject to NPDES
permitting without review would be arbitrary and capricious.
6. The case of Sierra Club v. Abston Constr. Co., Inc. speaks to the
possibility that if normally unchanneled surface waters or rainfall runoff is
purposely channeled in connection with business activities it can be considered
point source pollution. 620 F.2d 41, 47 (5th Cir. 1980).
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Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc., 399 F.3d at 498. Furthermore, Moon
Moo Farm did not comply with the NMP since the acid whey
interfered with the nutrient uptake assumptions outlined.7
In response, EPA and Moon Moo Farm will argue that, if
Moon Moo Farm is not a CAFO, application of manure in
compliance with an NMP exempts it from NPDES permitting
liability through the agricultural stormwater exemption. EPA
and Moon Moo Farm, like the district court, will rely on Alt v.
EPA, which stated runoff caused by precipitation fell within
agricultural stormwater exemption and was not subject to
NPDES permitting. 979 F. Supp. 2d at 711-12. The CWA
specifically exempts agricultural stormwater discharges from its
NPDES permitting requirements. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14).
Regulations expand on the agricultural stormwater exemption to
state that when manure has been applied in accordance with a
site specific NMP that ensures proper utilization of the nutrients,
any precipitation related discharge is an agricultural stormwater
discharge within the exemption. 40 C.F.R. § 122.23(e).
Agricultural stormwater discharges occur when precipitation
comes in contact with the land area and causes runoff into
navigable waters. Fisherman Against Destruction of Env’t v.
Closter Farms, Inc., 300 F.3d 1294, 1297 (11th Cir. 2002) (held
discharge of rainwater was agricultural stormwater discharge);
see Southview Farm, 34 F.3d at 121. EPA’s 2003 CAFO rule
expanded the exemptions under the agricultural stormwater
exemption to include discharges from land application if it was
according to a site specific NMP. Nat’l Pork Producers Council,
635 F.3d. at 744. Moon Moo Farm is currently a “no-discharge”
AFO but has also submitted an NMP that sets forth manure
application rates along with expected uptake of nutrients by the
crops grown. They will argue that in the case of a “no-discharge”
AFO without a NPDES permit, there is no requirement that an
NMP go through public review and comments to be effective. 73
Fed. Reg. at 70,418. A facility operator must certify that there is

7. Some states have specific Nutrient Management Acts, which pertain to
agricultural facilities and require that the operator of a CAFO shall develop and
implement an NMP that must be submitted for review. See 3 Pa. Cons. Stat.
Ann. § 506(b) (West 2014); see also Syngaro –WWT, Inc. v. Rush Tp., Pa., 299 F.
Supp. 2d 410, 417 (M.D. Pa. 2003); Wash. Dep’t of Ecology v. Douma, 193 P.3d
1102, 1107 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008).
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no current discharge and no potential for discharge, taking into
account practices and procedures of the NMP. Id. As Moon Moo
Farm is deemed by the State of New Union DOA to be a “nodischarge” AFO, there is no need to apply for a NPDES permit, as
there must be an actual discharge into navigable water to trigger
the permit requirement. Nat’l Pork Producers Council, 635 F.3d
at 750.
VI. RCRA VIOLATIONS: IS MOON MOO FARM
SUBJECT TO A CITIZEN SUIT UNDER THE
RESOURCE CONSERVATION AND RECOVERY
ACT?
A. When applied to the soil as fertilizer and soil
amendment, does a mixture of manure and acid whey
from a yogurt processing facility constitute a solid waste
subject to regulation under RCRA Subtitle D?
Riverwatcher contends, in the alternative to its CWA
claims, see infra note 8, that the landspread mixture of manure
and acid whey from Moon Moo Farm constitutes a solid waste
and is subject to regulation under the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA) Subchapter IV open dumping provision.
The purpose of RCRA is to establish federal guidelines for the
management and disposal of solid waste from both industrial and
non-industrial sources and to prohibit the open dumping of solid
waste. EPA and Moon Moo Farm contend that the landspread
mixture of manure and acid whey does not constitute a solid
waste under RCRA and is therefore not subject to regulation
under Subtitle D.
The policy and purpose behind RCRA was to reduce or
eliminate the generation of solid waste and ensure that any solid
waste that is generated is treated and disposed of in way that
minimizes the threat to human health and the environment. 42
U.S.C. § 6902(b). Under RCRA, a solid waste is considered to be
any discarded material that is a solid, liquid or semisolid material
that results from an industrial, commercial, or agricultural
operation. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27). This does not include solid waste
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from industrial discharges as point source that are subject to
permitting under the NPDES program of the CWA.8 Id. Also
under RCRA Subchapter IV, any solid waste management
practice or disposal considered to be open dumping is prohibited.
42 U.S.C. § 6945(a). RCRA further defines open dumping to
include any facility where solid waste is disposed of that is not
considered a sanitary landfill. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(14). However,
EPA regulations specifically exclude land application of
agricultural waste used for fertilizer or soil conditioner from the
open dumping provision. 40 C.F.R. § 257.1(c)(1).
Is the landspread mixture a solid waste?
The court must first determine whether the manure and acid
whey mixture that Moon Moo Farm applies to its Bermuda grass
fields constitutes a solid waste. Both sides will look at whether
the landspread mixture was discarded under the definition of
solid waste. 40 C.F.R. § 261.2(a)(2)(i)(A)-(D). Riverwatcher will
argue that the mixture is actually being discarded by Chokos and
falls under the regulation of RCRA. It will rely on the Ninth
Circuit cases of Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer and Ecological
Rights Found. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. to argue that the mixture
falls within the definition of solid waste. 373 F.3d 1035 (9th Cir.
2004); 713 F.3d 502 (9th Cir. 2013). EPA and Moon Moo Farm
will argue that the landspread mixture is not discarded and
therefore does not fall under the definition of solid waste. EPA
and Moon Moo Farm will rely on the congressional intent of
RCRA and current regulations under RCRA that exempt certain
agricultural waste. They will also point to the benefits of the
landspreading application to show that it is not a waste. See
Oklahoma v. Tyson Foods, Inc., No. 05-CV-0329-GKF-PJC, 2010
WL 653032 (N.D. Okla. Feb. 17, 2010); Safe Food & Fertilizer v.
EPA, 350 F.3d 1263 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
Riverwatcher’s argument that the landspread mixture
constitutes a solid waste turns on whether it can show that Moon

8. Therefore, Riverwatcher can only bring this RCRA claim if Moon Moo
Farm is found not to be a CAFO subject to NPDES permitting or its discharges
are exempt from NPDES permitting under the agricultural stormwater
exemption. Accordingly, this issue will be argued in the alternative to the CAFO
issue.
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Moo Farm contributes to the “handling, storage, treatment,
transportation or disposal” of any solid waste. 42 U.S.C §
6972(a)(1)(B). The Ninth Circuit adopted the ordinary, plain
meaning of discarded: “to cast aside, reject, abandon, or give up.”
Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d at 1041; see also
Ecological Rights Found. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 713 F.3d at 515;
Cmty. Ass’n for Restoration of Env’t, Inc. v. George & Margaret
LLC, 954 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1156 (E.D. Wash. 2013). In Safe Air,
the Ninth Circuit also laid out three approaches to help determine
whether a material qualifies as a discarded solid waste. 373 F.3d
at 1043.
 Whether the material is destined for a beneficial use
through a continuous process by the generating industry.
Id. (citing Am. Mining Congress v. U.S. EPA, 824 F.2d
1177, 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
 Whether the material is being actively reused, or whether
there is only potential for reuse. Id. (citing Am. Mining
Congress v. U.S. EPA, 907 F.2d 1179, 1186 (D.C. Cir.
1990)).
 Whether its original owner is using the material. Id. (citing
United States v. ILCO, 996 F.2d 1126, 1131 (11th Cir.
1993)).
Riverwatcher will contend that, although the manure and
acid whey mixture is being actively reused, it is not being put to
beneficial use nor is its original owner, Chokos Greek Yogurt,
using it. Instead, Moon Moo Farm is adding the acid whey from
the Chokos plant to its manure and landspreading the mixture in
an effort to get rid of it on behalf of Chokos.
Riverwatcher may also point to several other definitions of
discarded. For example, the Second Circuit has found a product to
be a discarded waste when it has served its intended purpose and
is no longer wanted. No Spray Coal, Inc. v. N.Y.C., 252 F.3d 148,
150 (2d Cir. 2001). A mixture could also be found to be a
discarded solid waste if it is applied beyond what was necessary
to serve as fertilizer and therefore no longer serves its intended
purpose. George & Margaret LLC, 954 F. Supp. 2d at 1156-58.
Riverwatcher will argue that the addition of the acid whey to the
manure has no real intended purpose or benefit and is no longer
wanted by Chokos or Moon Moo Farm when it is applied to the
Bermuda grass fields.
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EPA and Moon Moo Farm will counter that the mixture of
manure and acid whey is not considered a solid waste and
therefore is not subject to regulation under RCRA. Congressional
intent was that agricultural waste returned to the soil for use as
fertilizer and conditioner is not to be considered discarded
material under RCRA. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1491(I), at 2 (1976). A
major objective of RCRA is to increase the reclamation and reuse
practices of agriculture, reducing the volume of the discarded
material disposal problem under RCRA. Id.; see also Safe Air for
Everyone, 373 F.3d at 1045 (holding that grass residue was not
solid waste). EPA and Moon Moo Farm will assert that the land
application of the manure and acid whey mixture is of beneficial
use to the fields and therefore cannot be considered discarded
material under the definition of solid waste. 40 C.F.R. §
261.2(a)(2)(i)(A)-(D). When the mixture is applied for a normal,
beneficial and intended use, even if it is not fully utilized as such,
it is not considered a solid waste subject to regulation under
RCRA. Tyson Foods, Inc., 2010 WL 653032, at *10-11. Application
of the agricultural waste mixtures to fields is a normal use for the
product and it was the intended use of Moon Moo Farm. In
determining whether the mixture has a beneficial use, courts
have considered whether it has market value or is being put to
good use. Safe Food and Fertilizer v. E.P.A., 350 F.3d at 1269.
Moon Moo Farm will state that, although the mixture may not
necessarily have a market value outside its property, it is being
put to good use in the fields as it enhances the growth of the
Bermuda grass that is dried and harvested as silage during the
summer.
Is the application of the landspread mixture
considered open dumping?
Next, the court must determine whether Moon Moo Farm’s
application of the landspread mixture to its Bermuda grass fields
is considered open dumping under RCRA. This issue turns on
whether Moon Moo Farm uses its manure and acid whey mixture
as a fertilizer or soil conditioner and therefore falls under the
exemption for agricultural waste. The district court in this case
relied on a specific exemption in the solid waste disposal
regulations for agricultural waste, including manure, which is
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returned to the soil for fertilizer or conditioner. 40 C.F.R. §
257.1(c)(1).
Riverwatcher will argue that Moon Moo Farm is not using
the landspread mixture as a fertilizer or soil conditioner because
the addition of the acid whey to the mixture is not for the benefit
of the soil. Rather, the addition of the acid whey to the mixture is
a method of waste disposal on behalf of Chokos. This violates the
RCRA open dumping provision and does not fall under the
exemption of agricultural waste used for fertilizer or soil
conditioner. 40 C.F.R. § 257.1(c)(1).
Riverwatcher will also argue that the application of the
landspread mixture violates certain EPA guidelines prohibiting
practices of solid waste disposal (including open dumping onto
fields in certain situations) that have a reasonable probability of
adverse effects. 40 C.F.R § 257.3. It will argue that there is a
reasonable probability of adverse effects here as the landspread
mixture discharges to the canal and contributes to the nitrate
advisories. First, Riverwatcher will assert that Moon Moo Farm
is located in a floodplain due to its proximity to the Deep Quod
River and that the application of the mixture results in a washout
of solid waste. 40 C.F.R. § 257.3-1. Riverwatcher will point out
that the mixture is applied to an area used for the production of
food-chain crops that is not at a pH level above 6.5. 40 C.F.R §
257.3-5. This claim is based on the testimony of Dr. Ella Mae,
who stated that the addition of the acid whey to the manure
mixture increased the acidity of the mixture and lowered the pH
of the soil to 6.1 when applied to the Bermuda grass fields. The
lowered pH level then prevents the soil from properly absorbing
the nutrients in the mixture. Finally, Riverwatcher will assert
that the application of the manure and acid whey mixture is done
in such a way that may contaminate groundwater and
underground drinking water. 40 C.F.R. § 257.3-4. According to
Dr. Mae, since the soil was prevented from properly absorbing the
nutrients from the mixture, the nutrients not absorbed by the soil
then leach into the groundwater.
EPA and Moon Moo Farm will counter that the land
application of the manure and acid whey mixture is exempt from
the open dumping provision because it falls within the
agricultural waste exemption. 40 C.F.R. § 257.1(c)(1). Moon Moo
Farm uses the mixture as a fertilizer and soil conditioner for its
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Bermuda grass fields. The addition of the acid whey is not just
performed as a means of disposal. They will assert that there is
insufficient evidence to show that addition of the acid whey to the
manure is not done for fertilizing or soil conditioning purposes.
Hackensack Riverkeeper, Inc. v. Del. Ostego Corp., 450 F. Supp.
2d at 487. There must be sufficient evidence for Riverwatcher to
substantiate specific claims under the regulations for open
dumping. Id. They will point to the testimony of Moon Moo
Farm’s expert, Dr. Emmet Green, who did not dispute the fact
that the acid whey reduced the pH level of the soil and the
nutrient uptake. However, he stated that the addition of whey to
manure to be used as soil conditioner is a recognized agricultural
practice of the State of New Union. Dr. Green also testified that
although the pH level of the soil is reduced, Bermuda grass has a
wide range of acceptable pH levels that still allow for the
absorption of nutrients. The reduction in the pH level would
therefore not violate 40 C.F.R. § 257.3-5. Additionally, they will
argue that Riverwatcher has not provided enough evidence to
assert that the application of the landspread mixture
contaminated ground water and contributed to the recent nitrate
advisories in the State of New Union. 40 C.F.R. § 257.3-4.
Without sufficient evidence, the claims that Moon Moo Farm has
violated the open dumping provision cannot stand. Dague v. City
of Burlington, 732 F. Supp. 458, 467 (D. Vt. 1989).
B. Do Moon Moo Farm’s landspreading practices present
an imminent and substantial endangerment to human
health or the environment subject to citizen suit redress
under RCRA?
Under RCRA, a citizen suit action is permitted against any
person who contributes to a situation that may present an
imminent and substantial endangerment to human health or the
environment.
EPA
and
Riverwatcher
contend
that
Riverwatcher has established an imminent and substantial
endangerment to human health claim for Moon Moo Farm’s
application of the landspread mixture. Moon Moo Farm
contends that Riverwatcher has not established sufficient
evidence to bring an imminent and substantial endangerment
claim.
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Under § 7002(a)(1)(B) of RCRA, a citizen suit civil action can
be brought against any person, including any past or present
owner or operator of a facility, who is contributing or has in the
past contributed to the disposal of a solid waste which may
present and imminent and substantial endangerment to health or
the environment. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B). After establishing
that the landspread mixture is a solid waste, Riverwatcher will
need to establish three elements in order to bring such a RCRA
claim against Moon Moo Farm:
 the application of the landspread mixture may present an
imminent and substantial endangerment to the health of
residents in the area around Moon Moo Farm;
 the potential endangerment stems from past or present
disposal of the manure and acid whey mixture; and
 Moon Moo Farm is currently contributing or has
contributed in the past to the disposal of the manure and
acid whey mixture through landspreading.
Here, the district court dismissed Riverwatcher’s RCRA
claim because the manure and acid whey mixture do not
constitute a solid waste as defined by RCRA. 42 U.S.C. §
6903(27). (However, EPA and Riverwatcher can point to Conn.
Coastal Fishermen’s Ass’n v. Remington Arms, in which the
Second Circuit held that a material could still be a statutory solid
waste for a § 7002(a)(1)(B) imminent and substantial
endangerment action even though it was excluded from an EPA
regulatory program. 989 F.2d 1305, 1314-15 (2d Cir. 1993).) The
district court went on to hold that, even if the mixture was
considered to be a solid waste, Riverwatcher did not present
sufficient evidence to bring a claim under § 7002(a)(1)(B) of RCRA
for imminent and substantial endangerment to human health or
the environment. This determination was based on testimony
provided by Riverwatcher’s expert regarding the lack of a clear
causal link to the nitrate advisories in Farmville. In addition, the
nitrate levels posed no health risks to adults and juveniles, except
infants who were given bottled water and not harmed. The
district court cited the case of Davies v. Nat’l Co-op Refinery Ass’n
for the principle that, in order to be a health risk, exposure to the
risk would need to be present. 963 F. Supp. 990, 999 (D. Kan.
1997). Since, due to the nitrate advisory, no one was exposed to
the elevated nitrate levels, there could not be a risk of imminent
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and substantial endangerment to human health from Moon Moo
Farm’s landspreading activities.
Thus, the resolution of this RCRA citizen suit issue will turn
on whether Riverwatcher has sufficient evidence that Moon Moo
Farm is contributing or has contributed to the disposal of a solid
waste which may present an imminent and substantial
endangerment to the health of the people of Farmville. EPA and
Riverwatcher will argue that Moon Moo Farm’s application of
the landspread mixture, which is a solid waste under RCRA,
presents an imminent and substantial endangerment to the
health of the people of Farmville as evidenced by the multiple
nitrate advisories. They will rely on Dague v. City of Burlington
as well as U.S. v. Conservation Chem. Co. to establish the level of
endangerment needed. 935 F.2d 1343 (2d Cir. 1991); 619 F. Supp.
162 (W.D. Mo. 1985). They will also rely on two Missouri cases to
help define the terms imminent and substantial as well as the
standard for being a contributor to the endangerment. In
response, Moon Moo Farm will rely on Meghrig v. KFC W., Inc.
and Price v. United States Navy to show that the danger here was
neither imminent nor substantial. 516 U.S. 479 (1996); 39 F.3d
1011 (9th Cir. 1994). Moon Moo Farm will also argue that there is
no causal link between its activities and the elevated nitrate
levels in the river, and so it cannot be held liable as a contributor.
EPA and Riverwatcher will argue that there is sufficient
evidence to establish that Moon Moo Farm’s application of the
manure and acid whey mixture to its Bermuda grass fields
presents an imminent and substantial endangerment actionable
under RCRA § 7002. To establish a claim of endangerment, they
need only demonstrate a significant risk of harm, not actual
harm. Dague, 935 F.2d at 1356. Endangerment may be declared
at any point in the chain of events that may produce harm to the
public; it does not have to be at the exact point the harm
occurred. Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. E.P.A., 465 F.2d 528, 535 (D.C.
Cir. 1972). Riverwatcher claims that the elevated nitrate levels in
Farmville’s water supply (as evidenced by the nitrate advisories)
present an imminent and substantial endangerment to the health
of the people of Farmville. To show that the harm is imminent,
Riverwatcher does not need to prove that the harm will occur
tomorrow, just that threat of harm exists now. United States v.
Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. at 194. Imminence is
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satisfied if the factors leading to harm are present, even if the
harm itself does not occur until years in the future. Id.
Imminence refers to the nature of the threat rather than the time
frame. Dague, 935 F.2d at 1356. Courts have been reluctant to
narrowly define the term substantial. Cordiano v. Metacon Gun
Club, Inc., 575 F.3d 199, 210-11 (2d Cir. 2009). To show that the
endangerment is substantial, Riverwatcher must show that the
facts imply a serious harm. Id. Courts have considered an
endangerment to be substantial when there is reasonable cause
for concern of harm. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. at 194.
EPA and Riverwatcher will argue that the numerous nitrate
advisories issued in Farmville suggest that there is a potential
and recurring serious harm that exist now and might endanger
the public in the future.
To hold Moon Moo Farm liable for disposal of the solid waste,
EPA and Riverwatcher must also argue that Moon Moo Farm’s
landspreading of the manure and acid whey mixture is a
contributing factor to the threat of endangerment. United States
v. Bliss, 667 F. Supp. 1298, 1313 (E.D. Mo. 1987); 42 U.S.C. §
6972(a)(1)(B) (a citizen suit claim can be brought against anyone
who has contributed or is contributing). Although, the definition
of contribute is not explicitly stated within RCRA, the nature of
RCRA and the citizen suit provision suggests a liberal
construction that errs on the side of protecting human health and
the environment. Aiello v. Town of Brookhaven, 136 F. Supp. 2d
81, 112 (E.D.N.Y. 2001). Importantly, the plain meaning of
contribute is to “have a share in” or in other instances “help to
cause.” Id. at 111-12; see also United States v. Aceto Agric. Chems.
Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1384 (8th Cir. 1989); Zands v. Nelson, 779
F. Supp. 1254, 1264 (S.D. Cal. 1991). Therefore, EPA and
Riverwatcher will argue that even if Moon Moo Farm is not the
sole cause of the nitrate advisories and subsequent endangerment
to Farmville, it can still be held liable as a contributor because it
has helped to cause the elevated nitrate levels in the river.
Moon Moo Farm will respond that Riverwatcher has not
established sufficient evidence to bring an imminent and
substantial endangerment claim against it for its application of
the landspread mixture to the Bermuda grass fields. The
Supreme Court has stated that endangerment can only be
considered imminent if the harm threatens to occur immediately.
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Meghrig v. KFC W., Inc., 516 U.S. at 485-86. This excludes waste
that no longer presents a danger. Id. In addition, a threat must
be present now even if the actual harm or impact is not apparent
until later in time. Price, 39 F.3d at 1019. Endangerment is
substantial if it is serious and indicates a necessity for action. Id.
Moon Moo Farm will argue that the harm in this case is not
imminent because it is not currently present. The last nitrate
advisory was issued over a year ago. In addition, as the district
court stated, there is no serious harm when the nitrate advisories
for water are only issued with regard to infants who were not
harmed because they drank bottled water.
Moon Moo Farm will also argue that it cannot be a
contributor as defined by the statute because one must act as a
determining factor in order to contribute. Murtaugh v. New York,
810 F. Supp. 2d 446, 474 (N.D.N.Y. 2011); see also Interfaith
Cmty. Org. v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 263 F. Supp. 2d 796, 844
(D.N.J. 2003). There must be more than just mere ownership of a
property; a level of causation must exist between the actions of
the owner and the alleged endangerment. Delaney v. Town of
Carmel, 55 F. Supp. 2d 237, 256 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). Thus, the
necessary interpretation of a person who has contributed or is
contributing was only intended to impose liability on those shown
to have affirmatively acted as a determining, causal factor in the
endangerment. Id. Relying on Riverwatcher’s expert testimony
that it was impossible to state that Moon Moo Farm was the “but
for” cause of the 2013 nitrate advisory, Moon Moo Farm will
argue that the necessary causal link between the landspreading
and the nitrate advisories cannot be made.
This is not intended to be an exhaustive analysis of the
problem, merely an indicative list of issues to be
addressed by teams. One should appreciate reasoned and
reasonable creativity and ideas beyond those in this
limited analysis.
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VII. SAMPLE JUDGES QUESTIONS
These questions are suggested as a starting point. Please feel
free to develop your own questions.
Issue 1: Public Trust Doctrine
 EPA and Riverwatcher
o The Queechunk Canal is a man-made body of
water located on private land. What makes it
subject to the public trust doctrine?
o Wouldn’t subjecting the Queechunk Canal to the
public trust doctrine weaken the integrity of
private property rights?
o If a waterway is made navigable at the hands of a
private party, why should it automatically be
subject to public use?
 Moon Moo Farm
o Isn’t the purpose of the public trust doctrine to
safeguard navigable waters for use in commerce or
the enjoyment of the public?
o If the canal was constructed to be deep enough for
a small boat to navigate it and connects at both
ends to a navigable waterway, shouldn’t it be
subject to public use?
o Why should a natural waterway and a man-made
waterway be treated differently in relation to the
public trust doctrine?
Issue 2: Exclusionary Rule
 EPA and Riverwatcher
o If this court determines that James was
trespassing at the time he collected the evidence,
why should we admit that evidence?
o Wouldn’t admitting the evidence collected by
James be a violation of Moon Moo Farm’s Fourth
Amendment rights?
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o Does the deterrent effect of discouraging trespass
to obtain evidence outweigh the public benefit of
knowing of Moon Moo Farm activity?
 Moon Moo Farm
o Why should this court apply the exclusionary rule
when historically it is applied to criminal cases
and not civil cases?
o How is James an agent of Riverwatcher or of EPA?
o How does the deterrent effect of discouraging
trespass by private citizens outweigh the public
benefit of knowing of Moon Moo Farm’s
discharging into the Queechunk Canal?
Issue 3: CAFO
 EPA and Riverwatcher
o Does Moon Moo Farm have an actual discharge
from its production area or manure collection
facilities?
o Don’t the regulations prevent classification of Moon
Moo Farm as a CAFO as long as there is no
discharge from the production area and manure
lagoon?
o Why should this court consider evidence of a
discharge from Moon Moo Farm that was obtained
illegally, since this is the only evidence EPA and
Riverwatcher have of a discharge?
 Moon Moo Farm
o If Moon Moo Farm fits into the requirements of a
Medium CAFO and is discharging manure from its
lagoon via its landspreading operations, shouldn’t
it be required to obtain a NPDES permit?
o If Moon Moo Farm is contributing to pollution of
the Queechunk Canal, doesn’t the government
have a responsibility to regulate it?
o Regardless of how the evidence was collected,
doesn’t this court have an obligation to consider it
in matters of upholding the CWA?

33

50 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW ONLINE [Vol. 6
Issue 4: Agricultural Stormwater Exemption
 Riverwatcher
o Wouldn’t determining that the landspreadng
vehicles are point sources undermine EPA’s
regulation regarding discharging CAFOs?
o What criteria should this court use in determining
what is best management practices for procedures
carried out according to an NMP?
o Does the regulation specifically state that public
review and comment must be completed for the
State of New Union to classify Moon Moo Farm as
a “no-discharge” AFO?
 EPA and Moon Moo Farm
o If Moon Moo Farm is discharging excess nutrients,
shouldn’t it be regulated, regardless of whether it
has an NMP?
o If Moon Moo Farm is not landspreading in
accordance with its NMP, wouldn’t that remove it
from protection under the agricultural stormwater
exemption?
o How is landspreading beneficial if it is being over
applied or misapplied?
Issue 5: Solid Waste under RCRA Subtitle D
 Riverwatcher
o Why would this court not follow the legislative
intent of RCRA drafters, which states that
agricultural waste being used as soil fertilizers or
conditioners is exempt from regulation?
o How does a manure and acid whey mixture that is
purposefully being applied to Moon Moo Farm’s
fields fit into being “discarded” under the
definition of solid waste?
o Doesn’t the manure and acid whey mixture have a
beneficial use to the fields of Bermuda grass?

 EPA and Moon Moo Farm

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol6/iss1/2

34

2015]

NELMCC BENCH MEMO

51

o The general definition of solid waste includes any
solid, liquid or semisolid resulting from an
agricultural operation that is not subject to
NPDES permitting. Why would this not apply to
Moon Moo Farm’s manure and acid whey mixture?
o How is the land application of the manure and acid
whey
mixture
not
considered
discarded,
abandoned or recycled?
o Does the addition of acid whey to the manure
mixture have a beneficial use as a fertilizer or soil
conditioner for the Bermuda grass?
Issue 6: Imminent and Substantial Endangerment
 EPA and Riverwatcher
o If there is no harm done to the people of Farmville,
how can there be an imminent a substantial
endangerment?
o What evidence suggests that there is an
endangerment present now?
o Is Moon Moo Farm a “but for” cause of the nitrate
advisory? If not, how can they be held liable?
 Moon Moo Farm
o Doesn’t the issuance of nitrate advisories suggest
that there is the possible presence of harm?
o Even if Moon Moo Farm is not the “but for” cause
of the advisories, aren’t they still liable as a
contributor?
o Shouldn’t this court interpret the language of
RCRA liberally to ensure the best remedy for the
people of Farmville?
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